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ARGUMENT

I.

S&A SOUGHT NARROW RELIEF FROM THE BEGINNING.

Robinson claims that S&A did not "satisfy all the necessary requirements" under
Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy, 237 P.2d 421,425 (Utah 1951), but only questions one:
reasonableness of the restraint. Appellee's Brief at 14-15. To challenge reasonableness,
and to distract from the narrow restraint S&A actually sought, Robinson devotes pages to
@

a recitation of contract limitations that he did not violate, and which S&A never
employed to enjoin him. 1 Appellee' s Brief at 15-21. Yet, Robinson contends that S&A
sought to restrict him under all terms of all restrictive covenants. Id. at 17. As his only
support, Robinson cites in isolation paragraph 49(a) of S&A's Complaint (R. 13,
requesting a declaration on enforceability), ignoring the limiting terms it incorporates that
identify the actual scope of enforcement sought. See R. 14 ,I 49(d); R. 18 ,I 70.
Let us be clear. S&A asked for a declaration that the restrictive covenants were
valid and enforceable in order to authorize the needed injunctive remedy. See R. 13-14

,J,J 49(a), 49(d) (seeking injunctive relief"as requested below"). Indeed, each of S&A's
claims seeks injunctive relief "as requested below." R. 14, ,I 49(d) ("[A]s a result of
Robinson's breaches or threatened breaches of the Restrictive Covenants and his other
wrongful conduct as alleged herein, ARM and Solar are entitled to injunctive relief
~

against him, as requested below.") (emphasis added); R. 15, ,I 57 ("ARM and Solar are
entitled to injunctive relief against Robinson as requested below .... ") (emphasis

1

Neither Robinson nor the district court questions Robinson's harmful violations. See
Appellants' Brief at 4-5.

I
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added); R. 17, ,r 62 ("ARM and Solar are entitled to injunctive relief against Robinson as
requested below ....") (emphasis added). 2

And "below" (in paragraph 70, R. 18), the Complaint defined the scope of that
relief. It is limited only to enjoining Robinson's known or suspected misconduct-his
wrongful relationship with Solar's competitor, SunRun, and wrongful luring away of
S&A's employees-and to protecting S&A's information:
70.
ARM and Solar are entitled to an order that temporarily restrains and
preliminarily and permanently enjoins Robinson, along with his agents,
servants, employees, and all those persons and entities in active concert or
participation with him, as follows:

a.

From being employed by, or working for, Sunrun or any of its
subsidiaries or affiliates during the Restricted Period, as
defined in the LTIP Agreement;

b.

From soliciting or recruiting employees of ARM or Solar to
terminate their employment with ARM or Solar and go to
work for Sunrun or any other person or entity in competition
with ARM and Solar during the Restricted Period, as defined
in the LTIP Agreement, and during the five year restricted
period described in Paragraph 19 of the Sales Rep
Agreements; and

C.

From being employed by, or working for, Sunrun or any of its
subsidiaries or affiliates during and after the Restricted Period
where his wrongful use and disclosure of Confidential
Information of ARM or Solar, including its trade secrets, will
be inevitable, and from otherwise using or disclosing any
Confidential Information of ARM or Solar, including their
respective trade secrets, as defined in the Agreements.

R. 18 ,r 70 (emphasis added).
2

Ignoring that this limitation on relief was incorporated in all of S&A' s claims, Robinson
incorrectly says that the narrow relief S&A seeks "in one portion of the Complaint does
not limit the scope of relief sought in the Complaint's other claims." Appellee' s Brief at
46.

2
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Cj

Inexplicably, neither the district court's orders nor Robinson's brief cites this·
@

limiting claim of the Complaint. 3 And Robinson did not dispute that the scope of this
relief was reasonable or that his misconduct fell at the heart of the restrictive covenants,
not at the fringes where he prefers to focus.
Thus, the Complaint confirms that S&A sought from the start to enforce the
contract only to the extent of Robinson's actual misconduct. 4 This did not change at
summary judgment. R. 18. 5 S&A did not ask to enjoin Robinson from other conduct that
the covenants might preclude but which did not occur. Finally, paragraph 70 of the

(&f)

Complaint confirms that Robinson is wholly inaccurate in arguing that "[n]owhere in
their Complaint or during nearly two years of litigation did S&A ever suggest that they
were seeking only limited enforcement of the Restrictive Covenants." Appellee's Brief
at 38-39. Similarly, the district court was incorrect to conclude that S&A sought to
enjoin Robinson beyond the scope of his misconduct. 6 See R. 1423.

3

It is insufficient for the court to cite S&A' s termination letter to define the scope of the

relief S&A sought in paragraph 70 of the Complaint. R. 1428 (finding ARM's intent "to
take full advantage of every restrictive covenant" in the ARM Agreements was "made
clear" in the termination letter); see Sfirakis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 1991 WL 147482, *3
(E.D. Pa. July 24, 1991) (finding that a demand letter "is nothing more than posturing by
counsel" and "cannot override the ... complaint").
4
See In re Prithvi Catalytic, Inc., 571 B.R. 105, 130 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2017) ("[T]he
Court need not examine whether the large geographic area or the swath of restricted
activities identified in the non-compete agreements is overbroad, because it is only being
asked to apply the non-compete agreement within a narrowly-defined context ....").
5
Robinson incorrectly claims that S&A identified this narrow scope of relief for the first
time on summary judgment. Appellee' s Brief at 17.
6
Citing Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623, 627 (Utah 1982), Robinson says in passing that
S&A must also prove his services were "special, unique or extraordinary," and that his
job was not a "common calling." Appellee's Brief at 14-15, 20. The Robbins court
focused, not on the employee's "calling" or whether the services were "extraordinary,"
3
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II.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S APPLICATION OF A "STRICT
CONSTRUCTION" STANDARD WAS LEGAL ERROR AND
ABROGATED THE COURT'S DISCRETION.
A.

The District Court's Strict Construction Standard Was Legal Error.

The district court's first legal ruling on summary judgment announced the
standard used to construe the restrictive covenants. It said: "Restrictive covenants are not
favored in the law and are strictly construed .... " R. 1425. It based this on dicta from

St. Benedict's Development Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P .2d 194, 198 (Utah

~

1991). See R. 1425. Robinson proffered St. Benedict's, contending that the Utah
Supreme Court "has made clear" that "restrictive covenants must be strictly construed."

Id. (emphasis added); see also R. 1465 (Robinson arguing that "[t]he Supreme Court said
restrictive covenants are disfavored in Utah"). And the court adopted outright
Robinson's argument that "[r]estrictive covenants have long been disfavored under Utah
law." R. 360. The harsh tone of "disfavor" permeates many of the court's
characterizations and rulings.

~

But applying the strict construction/disfavored-at-law standard was legal error.

See Fort Pierce Industrial Park Phases II, III & IV Owners Ass 'n v. Shakespeare, 2016
UT 28, ,r 19,379 P.3d 1218 (holding that it was error to apply "strict construction" to

but on whether the employee was "largely responsible for the plaintiffs goodwill." 645
P.2d at 627-28. Robinson was largely responsible for much of S&A's employee
goodwill. See Appellants' Brief at 13-14. Moreover, Robbins' notions of"specialunique-extraordinary" services and "common callings" were not applied subsequently
when a sales representative's non-compete covenant was upheld in Kasco v. Benson,
which "eviscerates [Robbins v.] Finlay," according to Justice Stewart, Robbins' author.
831 P.2d 86, 93, 96 (Utah 1992) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
4
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restrictive covenants, and explaining that restrictive covenants are governed "'by the
same rules of construction as those used to interpret contracts' and that, 'generally,
unambiguous restrictive covenants should be enforced as written'") (quoting Swenson v.

Erickson, 2000 UT 16, ,I 21, 998 P.2d 807). 7
Because the district court applied a strict construction/disfavored-at-law standard,
contrary to Fort Pierce, the scope of the court's covenant analysis was wrong. Applying
this incorrect standard was reversible legal error.
Aware of this fatal error, Robinson denies that the mistake even happened. He
says that "the district court did not strictly construe" the covenants, but merely recited the
"necessary legal requirements" that Utah courts apply in noncompetition cases.
Appellee's Brief at 22. This ignores the district court's adoption of the strict construction
standard that Robinson argued "must" be applied. See R. 360. Robinson cites nothing
indicating that the district court did anything other than what it said-strictly construe the
parties' covenants. See R. 1425. Moreover, the noncompetition decisions Robinson cites

("Allen, Robbins, and System Concepts," Appellee's Brief at 22) did not strictly construe
the parties' covenants, find them "disfavored at law," or suggest that such a standard is a
4/J

"necessary legal requirement" applied to post-employment restrictive covenants.

7

In the district court, Robinson advanced St. Benedict's as controlling law. See R. 360.
St. Benedict's involved real property covenants, not post-employment restrictive
covenants. 811 P.2d at 197. Inconsistently, Robinson now argues that Fort Pierce
should be ignored because it involved restrictive covenants affecting real property, not
post-employment restrictive covenants. Appellee's Brief at 22. Robinson does not
explain his changed position.
5
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Furthermore, Microbiological Research Corp. v. Muna, 625 P .2d 690 (Utah 1981 ),
does not stand for the proposition that restrictive covenants in an employer-drafted
employment agreement must be strictly construed against the employer. Appellee's Brief
at 22. Muna's reference to strict construction relates to the "construe-against-the-drafter"
rule; the court did not imply that non-competition covenants are strictly construed. See
625 P.2d at 695-96 (since the employer drafted the contract, it was "construed
accordingly"). 8 And the rule that a contract should be construed less favorably against its
drafter applies only if extrinsic evidence cannot clarify uncertainty. See Brady v. Park,
2013 UT App 97, iJ 32, 302 P.3d 1220. This is not an issue here.
In sum, by treating the parties' covenants and S&A's covenant-related claims as
disfavored at law, and viewing them through the tainted lens of strict construction, the
district court committed a fundamental legal error. See Fort Pierce, 2016 UT 28, iJ 19.
B.

The Court's Legal Errors Abrogated Its Discretion.

Robinson urges the Court to disregard the district court's application of an
erroneous standard of review, and to ignore other rulings grounded in legal error, saying
these conclusions were merely an exercise of "judicial discretion" that, he implies, cures
the errors. See Appellee's Brief at 34-37. But Robinson overlooks the fact that any
attempted exercise of discretion based on rulings grounded in legal error abrogated the
district court's discretion by operation oflaw. See Miller v. Utah Dep 't ofTransp., 2012
UT 54, if 13 n.l, 285 P.3d 1208 ("[A]n error oflaw always constitutes an abuse of

8

The cases Muna cites confirm this. See Skousen v. Smith, 493 P.2d 1003, 1005 (Utah
1972); Guinand v. Walton, 450 P.2d 467,469 (Utah 1969).
6
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discretion."); Tolman v. Salt Lake City Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 26-27 (Utah Ct. App.
1991) (quoting Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 159 (Utah Ct. App. 1989))
{"Tribunals may exercise discretion in many matters where there are no hard and fast
rules of law and the tribunal is in an advantaged position to make the correct decision.
Discretion, however, 'is limited in that it must be exercised within the confines of the
legal standards set by appellate courts."'); United States v. Washington, 157 F.3d 630,
642 (9th Cir. 1998) ("The district court abuses its discretion when its equitable decision is
based on an error of law or a clearly erroneous factual finding."); First Wis. Nat'l Bank v.
KSW Investments, Inc., 238 N.W.2d 123, 126 (Wis. 1976) ("If a judge bases the exercise
of his discretion upon an error of law, his conduct is beyond the limits of discretion.")
(citation omitted); Austin-Casares v. Safeco Ins. Co. ofAm., 81 A.3d 200, 209-10 (Conn.
2013) ("[T]he trial court's decision was predicated on a misapplication of the law rather
than a reasoned exercise of discretion. As a result, that decision cannot stand."); Watson
~

v. Elberton-Elbert Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 189 S.E.2d 66, 67 (Ga. 1972) (noting that a trial
court's ruling, though ordinarily within its discretion, must be reversed where the ruling
shows that the trial court did not exercise its discretion but rendered judgment based on
an erroneous view of law that precluded the exercise of discretion); Jones v. LSUIEA
Conway Med. Ctr., 46 So.3d 205,210 (La. Ct. App. 2010) ("Although a reviewing court
defers to reasonable decisions within the trial court's discretion, a decision upon an
erroneous interpretation or application of the law, rather than a valid exercise of
discretion, is not entitled to such deference."). Utah courts will take corrective appellate
action on discretionary rulings based on errors of law even if the reviewing court
7
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

determines that a trial court could reach the same result under a proper application of law.
State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, iJ 17 n.5, 127 P.3d 682. 9

Here, the district court's "discretion" was misguided by an erroneous standard,
well outside the "arena" of discretion that defined the parameters. See Tolman, 818 P .2d
at 26. This error of law (and the district court's other legal errors discussed below)
abrogated any discretion the court might have exercised on summary judgment. As a
result, this Court should reverse the summary judgment ruling, even if it were possible
(and it is not) for the trial court to have reached the same result under a proper application
oflaw. See Barrett, 2005 UT 88, ,r 17 n.5.

III.

THE TRIAL COURT'S ADDITIONAL RULINGS ARE ALSO
GROUNDED ON A MISAPPLICATION OF LAW.
A.

The District Court Erred by not Applying Delaware Law to the LTIP
Agreement.
1.

The issue was preserved.

S&A showed that Delaware law governs both the LTIP Plan and LTIP Agreement,
and that, under Delaware law, courts partially enforce restrictive covenants found broader
than needed. Appellants' Brief at 18-19. Robinson urges the Court to overlook this,
claiming that S&A did not sufficiently raise the choice-of-law issue to invoke Delaware
law. Appellee's Brief at 24.
To preserve an issue for appeal, '"(l) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion;
(2) the issue must be specifically raised; and (3) a party must introduce supporting
9

Granting summary judgment on a misapplication of law is "plain error," Wilson ex rel.
Wilson v. Simmons, 103 S.W.3d 211,220 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003), and an error oflaw is
always an abuse of discretion, Miller, 2012 UT 54, ,r 13 n.1.
8
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evidence or relevant legal authority."' Pringsburg State Bank v. Abundo, 2012 UT 94,
<@

~ 17,296 P.3d 709 (quoting Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, ~ 15, 164 P.3d 366). Where the

district court has "an opportunity-and in fact [does ]-rule on these issues, they [are]
preserved." Id.

~

19.

S&A timely showed that the LTIP Agreement is governed by Delaware law, and
S&A supported this with multiple references to terms of the documents and relevant legal
authority, and the court ruled on the issue. See R. 1100, 1531-32, 1567-70, 1648-50.
Robinson fails to note that S&A showed at the summary judgment hearing how Delaware
@

law governs terms in both the LTIP Plan and LTIP Agreement that define Robinson's
covenant breaches, R. 1531-32, 1567-70; how it would "be an absurdity" to construe the
same "Restrictive Covenant Violation" using Delaware law for the LTIP Plan, but Utah
law for the LTIP Agreement, R. 1532; and that the LTIP Plan and Agreement must be
"construed as one whole and harmonized" because they are connected in time and

~

content as shown by their terms and by the case authorities S&A provided at the hearing,
which set forth this "common canon." ld. 10 Subsequently, when opposing Robinson's
motion for attorney fees, S&A again showed that Delaware law governs covenants of the
LTIP Agreement. R. 1648-50.

10

~

At the summary judgment hearing, S&A explained that the hearing offered the first
opportunity to address several issues, noting that Robinson's summary judgment
memorandum cited 12 authorities, while Robinson's 80-page reply memorandum cited
43. R. 1502. Robinson's summary judgment memorandum only addressed Delaware
and Utah law in a footnote, where he downplayed the difference in law, saying "the end
result would be the same" under either. R. 360 n.21.
9

~

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Thus, S&A' s detailed argument in favor of Delaware law, before and after
summary judgment, was not limited to "a few conclusory and unsupported sentences."
Appellee's Brief at 24. 11 This also confirms the district court's mistake when it said
inexplicably that "Solar asserts, without legal analysis, that Delaware law-which may
allow this blue-penciling-should govern the LTIP Agreement." R. 1437 (emphasis
added). The issue was preserved.
2.

Delaware law governs the LTIP Agreement.

Robinson attempts to isolate the LTIP Plan from the LTIP Agreement as though
one had no connection with the other, and argues that because the LTIP Plan selects
Delaware law while the LTIP Agreement is silent, Delaware law "applies only to 'the
Plan.'" Appellee's Brief at 24. This is incorrect because the documents are
interdependent and expressly share terms, confirming the application of Delaware law to
both.
First, where it is evident that the parties intend separate writings to constitute one
contract, the writings will be treated as one. See Sacramento Baseball Club, Inc. v. Great
N. Baseball Co., 748 P.2d 1058, 1059 (Utah 1987) ("If the parties intended to create one

contract, the number of documents that memorialize the agreement is irrelevant."). The
LTIP Plan and LTIP Agreement are clearly interrelated, and the parties intended them to
operate as a single agreement. By signing the LTIP Agreement, Robinson acknowledged
11

Robinson also argues that S&A's Complaint previously conceded that Utah law
governs every contract claim, citing a paragraph of the Complaint that only discusses the
ARM Agreements, which do adopt Utah law. Appellee's Brief at 24; R. 2. Not only
does this disregard the undisputed choice of Delaware law under the LTIP Plan, but it
misconstrues the Complaint.
10
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that he reviewed and understood "all provisions" of the LTIP Agreement "(including
(j

Appendix A [the restrictive covenants]), and the Plan." R. 1195 (emphasis added). The
LTIP Agreement instructed Robinson to "indicate whether or not you choose to accept
the Award on the terms set forth in this Award Agreement and the Plan .... " Id.
(emphasis added). And Robinson confirmed that he accepted the terms of both
documents: "I accept the Award on the terms set forth in this A ward Agreement and the

Plan." Id. (emphasis added). 12 Thus, contrary to Robinson's claim, by executing the
LTIP Agreement, the terms of both the LTIP Plan and LTIP Agreement became effective
simultaneously as to him. Robinson ignores these contract terms and the fact that only by
executing the LTIP Agreement could he participate in the LTIP Plan. HCA Health Servs.

of Utah, Inc. v. St. Mark's Charities, 846 P.2d 476,484 (Utah 1993) ("Multiple writings
must be considered together when part of the same contract.") (quotations and citation
omitted).
As a result, it is irrelevant that Solar "adopted" the LTIP Plan three months before
Robinson signed his LTIP Agreement. And even if the parties had signed each document
separately, months apart, such instruments may still be considered "executed
Gj)

contemporaneously." Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'/ Bank, 737 P.2d 225,229 (Utah 1987)
(holding that instruments executed two months apart were contemporaneous); Winegar v.
12

That the LTIP Plan was not separately signed is irrelevant. By signing the LTIP
Agreement, Robinson already agreed that the Award was based "on the terms set forth in
... the Plan" and in the Agreement. R. 1195. In all events, an instrument need not be
executed to be part of a single contract. See Estate Landscape & Snow Removal
Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 844 P .2d 322, 327 (Utah 1992)
(holding that two separate writings-including a check-constituted one offer where it
was obvious they should be construed together).
11
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Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 109 (Utah 1991) (holding that instruments executed two

months apart "were executed 'substantially contemporaneous' and [were] clearly
interrelated" and therefore had to be construed together).
In sum, the LTIP Plan and LTIP Agreement are expressly interconnected and
operate as one contract. To construe them harmoniously as a whole, they are governed
by the Plan's choice of Delaware law. See Tretheway v. Furstenau, 2001 UT App 400,

,I 9, 40 P.3d 649; HCA Health Servs. of Utah, Inc., 846 P.2d at 484.
Second, Robinson agreed that "[his] Award is subject to the terms of the Plan" and
the Agreement. R. 1195 (emphasis added). A term of the Plan is the express choice of
the "law of the state of Delaware." R. 1187. The LTIP Agreement has no conflicting
term. Additionally, the LTIP Agreement incorporates terms from the Plan with "the
meaning ascribed to such terms in the [LTIP] Plan." R. 1195 (emphasis added). Key

among these adopted terms is the phrase "Restrictive Covenant Violation," as discussed
in S&A' s Opening Brief. Appellants' Brief at 16-17. Under this term, Delaware law
applies specifically to identify whether Robinson committed an enforceable "Restrictive
Covenant Violation" and a "breach" under both the LTIP Plan and under the LTIP
Agreement, which borrows this term and its "meaning" from the LTIP Plan. Id. at 17.
Robinson has no answer to these contract terms. He largely ignores them, calling
them "immaterial." Appellee's Brief at 25. And Robinson gets no help by citing general
contract principles, see Appellee' s Brief at 25, or the notion of "most significant
relationship," see Appellee's Brief at 26 n.3. These concepts are rendered irrelevant by
the clear interdependence and shared terms of the LTIP Plan and LTIP Agreement.
12
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Accordingly, Delaware law (including its common law governing partial enforcement of

0P

restrictive covenants) applies to the restrictive covenants of Robinson's LTIP Agreement.
The district court's failure to apply Delaware law was plain error and is not subject to
discretion. See Watson v. Hatch, 728 P.2d 989, 990 (Utah 1986) (finding "plain error"
and reversing where district court failed to enforce an unambiguous timing provision in
contract).
B.

Delaware and Utah Courts Apply Blue-Pencil Principles of Partial
Enforcement.
Covenants of the LTIP Agreement should be enforced to the extent
reasonable under Delaware Law.

Under Delaware law, courts conform the scope of a restrictive covenant to proof
of the protection needed. See, e.g., Knowles-Zeswitz Music, Inc. v. Cara, 260 A.2d 171,
175 (Del. Ch. 1969) (ruling that "a restrictive covenant should be enforced only to the
extent that it is reasonable so to do," and that the stated geographical area at issue was
C@

"much too broad," but holding that former employee was enjoined from a more
reasonable geographic scope protecting plaintiffs interests); EDIX Media Grp., Inc. v.

Mahani, 2006 WL 3742595, at *8 (Del. Ch. Dec. 12, 2006) (enforcing limited scope of
non-competition agreement where covenant as drafted was "unenforceable as a matter of
[public] policy"); Appellants' Brief at 18-19 (citing additional Delaware authorities).
Neither Robinson nor the district court identifies any contrary case under
Delaware law where a restrictive covenant was not enforced to the extent reasonable, or
where enforcement was refused outright based on covenant breadth. Even Delaware

Elevator, Inc. v. Williams, which Robinson cites, enforced the covenant under Maryland

13
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law "to a reasonable extent," despite the court's personal belief that it was "overly broad
and unreasonable" "as drafted." 2011 WL 1005181, *1, *10 (Del. Ch. Mar. 16, 2011).
Robinson does not disclose this holding and cites only dicta consisting of the. court's nonbinding beliefs. Appellee's Brief at 36-37. 13
The district court's refusal to partially enforce Robinson's LTIP Agreement
covenants under Delaware law-consistent with S&A's narrow injunction request-was
reversible error. Additionally, because Delaware law governs those covenants, the
district court's stated Utah-law bases for its refusal are inherently incorrect. Finally,
because the district court's decision was grounded in erroneous legal rulings, the rulings

~

cannot be excused merely as an exercise of discretion. See First Wis. Nat'/ Bank, 238
N.W.2d at 126 ("If a judge bases the exercise of his discretion upon an error oflaw, his
conduct is beyond the limits of discretion.").
2.

Covenants of the ARM Agreement should be enforced to the extent
reasonable under Utah law.

Contrary to Robinson's characterizations, to invoke blue-pencil principles of

~

partial enforcement is not a request to "rewrite," "modify" or "reform" a contract.
Appellee's Brief at 27-28. Robinson cites no authority suggesting otherwise. With one
exception, the cases Robinson does cite relate to the general notion of rewriting
unambiguous contracts, and involve contexts other than restrictive covenants. See Zions

Mgmt. Servs. v. Record, 2013 UT 36, ,I 32,305 P.3d 1062 (in context of arbitration

13

In fact, citing only this dicta, Robinson incorrectly claims that "Delaware courts"
"have reached the same conclusion the district court reached here." Appellee's Brief at
36.
14
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i.,

provision governed by the Federal Arbitration Act); Perrenoud v. Harman, 2000 UT App
241, ,I·13 n.3, 8 P.3d 293 (refusing to rewrite inter vivos revocable trust as an irrevocable
trust); Genola Town v. Santaquin City, 110 P.2d 372, 373 (Utah 1941) (enforcing
contract as written). Even Systemic Formulas, Inc. v. Kim, which does concern restrictive
covenants, is off point. There, the court refused an injunction after the covenant's
restrictive period expired, saying that to "extend the duration of the agreement" beyond
the stated period would "violate the well-established rule that a court will not rewrite the
parties' contract." 2009 WL 4981631 at *3 (D. Utah Dec. 14, 2009). Systemic Formulas
does not involve enforcement of a covenant to a reasonable extent. 14
Rather than rewriting or reforming contracts, blue-pencil principles involve "a
partial enforcement of the contract" to give some effect to the parties' intentions.
Saccomanno v. Honeywell Int'!, Inc., 2010 WL 1329038, at *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. Apr. 7,

2010) (unpublished). This is similar to what the Utah Supreme Court did in J&K
Computer Sys., Inc. v. Parrish, 642 P.2d 732, 736 (Utah 1982) (enforcing restrictive

covenant as applied to case's particular facts rather than evaluating covenant breadth as
drafted), and System Concepts v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 427 (Utah 1983) (enforcing
restrictive covenant using evidence to find implied geographic limitation rather than
declaring covenant void). Robinson ignores Saccomanno and J&K Computer, but chides
S&A for not noting something in System Concepts that goes without saying-the court's

14

v,;)

Palmer & Cay, Inc. v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., 404 F.3d 1297, 1307 (11th Cir. 2005),
offers Robinson no help. Appellee's Brief at 37. Palmer followed Georgia law, which
"appl[ies] strict scrutiny" to restrictive covenants, 404 F.3d at 1303, unlike Utah law,
which does not. See Fort Pierce, 2016 UT 28, ,I 19.

15
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conclusions are based on "the particular circumstances" of the case. After all, the
reasonableness of covenant terms is always "determined on a case-by-case basis." 669
P .2d at 427. But Robinson ignores the larger principle garnered from System Concepts

(andJ&K Computer), which was readily observed by the court in Bad Ass Coffee Co. of
Haw., Inc. v. JH Nterprises, L.L.C: in Utah, "courts avoid reading covenants not to
compete in a manner that would render them unreasonable." 636 F. Supp. 2d 1237,
1246-47 (D. Utah 2009) (citing System Concepts and J&K Computer for the principle).
Thus, there is a basis in Utah law on which to apply principles of partial contract
enforcement, contrary to the district court's conclusion. R. 1438. The court erred in (i)
refusing to apply these principles to the narrow injunction S&A sought, (ii) finding the
parties' covenants "disfavored" at law, and (iii) strictly construing them against S&A so
fi&)

as to "render them unreasonable." Bad Ass Coffee, 636 F. Supp. 2d at 1246-47. These
errors are particularly evident because Robinson does not dispute the reasonableness of
the requested injunction. R. 18 iJ 70.
But even if Utah law justified the district court's refusal to partially enforce
covenants of the ARM Agreements (and it does not), the independent covenants in the

LTIP Agreement would still be enforced to the extent reasonable under Delaware law, as
shown above. See supra pp. 13-14.
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C.

Blue-Penciling Is Not "Reformation."

Like the district court, Robinson incorrectly conflates the doctrine of reformation
with blue-pencil principles. 15 "Blue-penciling, however, is not reformation of the
contract; it is partial enforcement of the contract. Blue-penciling does not require the
traditional showing for the equitable remedy of reformation." Saccomanno, 2010 WL
1329038, at *5; In re Prithvi Catalytic, Inc., 571 B.R. 105, 130 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2017)
(Under blue-pencil principles, "the court should .'seek to [partially] enforce the covenant
to the extent reasonably possible to accomplish the contract's purpose.'") (quoting

Emerick v. Cardiac Study Ctr., Inc., 357 P.3d 696, 703 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015)). Neither
Robinson nor the court cites contrary authority. S&A did not need to plead and prove a
claim for reformation for blue-pencil principles to apply, contrary to the district court's
ruling. R. 1427.
D.

The District Court's Refusal to Enforce Severability Clauses Was Error.
1.

~

The district court's severability-terms ruling was predicated on a
misapplication of unconscionability law.

The district court violated long-standing principles in finding unconscionability on
summary judgment where the issue was not known to the parties, not preserved, not
briefed, not argued, and not supported by a developed record. See Appellants' Brief at
24-32.

15

Robinson intentionally confuses the concepts, falsely saying S&A argued "bluepenciling or reformation." Appellee's Brief at 27, 29. In fact, the doctrine of reformation
was the district court's idea. R. 1427.

17
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First, it was error for the district court to rule sua sponte on unconscionability,
which was an unpreserved affirmative defense; and to rule without permitting S&A to
respond. See Neiman v. Galloway, 704 So.2d 1131, 1132 (Fla. Ct. App. 1998) (trial court
erred in addressing unraised affirmative defense of unconscionability sua sponte on
summary judgment); Lindemann v. Eli Lilly & Co., 816 F.2d 199,203 (5th Cir. 1987)
(reversing trial court which erred by addressing unconscionability sua sponte, which
"disadvantaged" the defendant, who was "entitled to fair notice that a portion of its
contract [would] be challenged for unconscionability"); Utah Code Ann.§ 70A-2-302
("When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause thereof may be
unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence
as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the
determination."); Res. Mgmt. Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028, 1041
(Utah 1985) ("Many courts have applied the U .C.C. approach to cases not strictly
governed by the U.C.C."); Restatement (Second) of Contracts§ 208 (1981) ("Uniform
Commercial Code§ 2-302 ... has proven very influential in non-sales cases.").
Second, Robinson incorrectly claims that S&A forced the district court to address
unconscionability just by citing the agreements' severability terms. Appellee's Brief at
31-32. To begin, Robinson ignores that the district court found the ARM Agreements to
be "substantively unconscionable" before it even addressed severability. R. 1427, 1429.
And neither Robinson nor the district court cites authority indicating that
unconscionability law governs the enforcement of severance terms. Rather, Utah law
provides that severability is based on the intent of the parties, as ascertained first from the
18
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language in the contract. See Mgmt. Servs. Corp. v. Dev. Assocs., 617 P.2d 406, 408
~

(Utah 1980). Here, the severability clauses are unambiguous as to the parties' intent that
the court sever unenforceable portions while enforcing the remainder. See R. 118 8, 791,
830. Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 361-64 (Utah 1996), does not help Robinson because
the unconscionability analysis there came before its severability analysis, not as part of it.
Third, even if "unconscionability" had been properly raised on a developed record,
neither Robinson nor the district court showed that unconscionability was established,
much less by "clear and convincing evidence." Res. Mgmt. Co., 706 P.2d at 1043. For
substantive unconscionability, the district court provided no meaningful analysis, just a
conclusion. See, e.g., R. 1427, 1430, 1438. On procedural unconscionability, the court
found that "undisputed evidence" established all six elements. R. 1431. But S&A
already showed that the court's "evidence" is not record evidence of "unconscionability."
Appellants' Brief at 28-32. And there was no evidence satisfying the requirement that

(@

"[t]he terms of the contract[] be considered according to the mores and business
practices of the time and place." See Sosa, 924 P.2d at 361 (quotations and citation
omitted); Appellants' Brief at 26-32. Tellingly, Robinson found so little evidence of
unconscionability, that he did not even assert the defense. And he cannot fill this void or
change the nature of the evidence just by declaring "S&A' s restrictive covenants onesided and oppressive" and rehashing court "findings" that rest on improper inferences and
assumptions drawn against S&A, the non-moving party, on summary judgment.
Appellants' Brief at 26-32; see Appellee's Brief at 33.
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2.

The severability terms are enforceable.

The agreements' severability clauses support enforcement of the restrictive
covenants to the extent reasonable. See Rockford Mfg., Ltd. v. Bennet, 296 F. Supp. 2d
681, 688-89 (D.S.C. 2003) (inclusion of severability clause reflected "intent of the
parties" that the restrictive covenant "be treated as such"); Brown & Brown, Inc. v. Ali,
592 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1046 (N.D. Ill. 2009) ("[M]odify[ing] an overly broad restrictive
covenant rather than invalidat[ing] it outright ... is particularly appropriate when the
agreement contains a severability clause.").
First, Robinson's claim that "S&A failed to preserve this argument" is without
merit. Appellee's Brief at 29. S&A did not simply mention the severability clauses
before the district court, it provided analysis under the severability clauses as an
additional basis to apply the blue-pencil doctrine. R. 1113-16, 1119-20, 1541-44. And
the district court ruled on severability. R. 1438. The issue was preserved. See Abundo,
2012 UT 94, ,r 17.
Second, S&A showed how the terms themselves pennit partial enforcement of the
restrictive covenants to receive appropriate protections. Appellants' Brief at 22-24. For
example, the LTIP Agreement states that "[i]f any provision is ... deemed to be invalid,
illegal, or unenforceable ... such provision shall be construed or deemed amended to
conform to the applicable laws .... " R. 1188 (emphasis added). Such terms reflect "a
mandatory 'blue-pencil' section" because it reflects "the intention of the parties that the
restrictive covenant will not be terminated but shall be deemed amended to the extent
~

required to render it valid and enforceable." Stamatakis Indus., Inc. v. King, 520 N.E.2d
20
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770, 774-75 (Ill. Ct. App. 1987) (emphasis added). Deeming the LTIP.Agreement
covenants amended to a reasonable extent is fully consistent with Delaware law. See
Knowles-Zeswitz Music, 260 A.2d at 175 (enforcing narrowed covenant that was

otherwise "much too broad"). And S&A explained how portions of the LTIP restrictive
covenants could be severed to narrow the covenants. See R. 1113-16. This evidencebased analysis should be completed on remand.
li)

Similarly, terms of the ARM Agreements confirm the parties' intent that each
provision of the Agreement "be interpreted in such a manner as to be effective and valid
under applicable law," but if any provision is found to be "invalid, illegal or
unenforceable," the Agreement "shall be reformed, construed and enforced ... as if such
... provision had never been contained ...." R. 610. This authorizes the district court
to interpret the ARM restrictive covenants consistent with evidence (adduced on remand)
of ARM's needed protection from Robinson's misconduct. See R. 1119-20. Robinson
did not contest the reasonableness of the restraint ARM requested (i.e., to preclude him
from soliciting ARM' s employees to work with him and SunRun, R. 18).
Hay Group, Inc. v. Bassick, 2005 WL 2420415 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2005) (an

unpublished ruling), does not change this result. There, the court did not sever portions
of a covenant found to be overbroad. But Robinson fails to note that the same court
subsequently undermined Hay in a published decision enforcing a severability clause,
concluding that the term evidenced "an intent by the parties that the restrictive covenant
vjj

should be enforced to the extent permitted by law." Brown & Brown, Inc., 592 F. Supp.
2d at 1046. And Simpson v. MSA ofMyrtle Beach, Inc., 644 S.E.2d 663, 673-74 (S.C.
21
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2007), dealt with an arbitration clause contained in a vehicle trade-in agreement that the
court characterized as an adhesion contract full of "oppressive and one-sided provisions."
In sum, like the contract terms in Brown & Brown, Inc., the parties' severability
clauses are enforceable here. Indeed, under the LTIP Agreement, enforcement should be
"mandatory." See Stamatakis, 520 N.E.2d at 774-75.

IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES.
A.

S&A's Claims Have a Basis in Fact and Law.

Robinson does not question the largely undisputed factual basis underlying S&A's
claims. Appellants' Brief at 33. Robinson plotted with a direct competitor of Solarwell before his termination-soliciting away S&A' s employees to work for the
competitor and an affiliate entity he created. Id. at 4-5. These violations went to the
heart of his covenants. S&A sued to enjoin only that conduct. R. 18, iJ 70. Robinson
ignores this, arguing (inaccurately) that "[n]owhere in the Complaint ... did S&A ever
suggest that they were seeking only limited enforcement of the Restrictive Covenants."
Appellee's Brief at 38-39. This does not address S&A's facts.
Similarly, S&A has shown that summary judgment was predicated on a
misapplication of law and of summary judgment standards. In so doing, S&A provided a
firm basis under Delaware and Utah law to enforce Robinson's covenants to the extent
reasonable. Appellants' Brief at 16-21; R. 1111-16, 1119-20, 1643-50. Robinson cannot
sweep S&A's many authorities under the rug by incorrectly claiming that S&A evaluates
its claims "in a vacuum devoid of the context," and that the "bare existence of a basis in
~

law for a potential claim is not sufficient to make a claim meritorious." Appellee's Brief
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~

at 39. Rather, S&A showed that under Delaware law, which governs the LTIP
@

Agreement, S&A is entitled to the relief it seeks. See Appellants' Brief at 16-19; supra

pp. 13-14. S&A also showed that Utah law supports that relief under the ARM
Agreements. See Appellants' Brief at 19-21; supra pp. 14-16. Even the district court
Gj

found that Solar's claims for partial enforcement had "some basis," and that S&A's bluepencil argument, which admittedly is unsettled in Utah, had to be raised in the district
court "before it can be raised at the appellate court level." R. 1823, 18 89.
Thus, for purposes of Utah Code§ 78B-5-825(1), S&A's claims were not "without
merit"; the claims had a solid basis in law and fact.
B.

S&A Brought and Maintained this Action in Good Faith.

Because S&A's claims have merit, the Court's analysis under Utah Code§ 78B-5825(1) ends here; the Court need not consider the conjunctive issue of bad faith. See Still

Standing Stable, LLC v. Allen, 2005 UT 46, iJ 7, 122 P.3d 556. But if the Court considers

Gb

"bad faith," it will find that the record contains no evidence that S&A had the "subjective
intent" to bring or assert this action in bad faith. Id. ,I 13.
Robinson cannot add to or change the benign nature of the evidence by charging
that S&A did not marshal evidence supporting the district court's conclusion. Appellee's
Brief at 41. S&A addressed the district court's "evidence" of bad faith, and Robinson

~

identifies no "facts" that S&A omitted. Appellants' Brief at 38-4 7. This is
understandable because the scant summary judgment record does not contain evidence
consistent with the type of evidence constituting bad faith in Utah case law. See
Appellants' Brief at 46-47 (analyzing Utah decisions); see also Fadel v. Deseret First
23
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Credit Union, 2017 UT App 165, 1136-37, ---P.3d--- (finding bad faith where attorney-

plaintiff pursued a second action where his position "had been repeatedly rejected" in a
previous action). Robinson does not question S&A's analysis of these authorities. 16
Robinson devotes the balance of his brief simply to a recitation of the trial court's
®t)

findings, which consist primarily of iterations of the same declaratory relief claim from
S&A' s Complaint. S&A responded fully to the district court's "evidence" of bad faith
and need not restate that detailed analysis here. See Appellants' Brief at 38-47. Not only
does that analysis confirm that the court's bad-faith finding is clearly erroneous, but the
district court itself concluded as to Solar that: "[D]uring summary judgment Solar at least
made some argument and provided some basis as to why and how the Court could
enforce a more limited scope of the restrictive covenants. The Court is not convinced
that Solar's argument on this issue was necessarily made in bad faith." R. 1889

(emphasis added). There was no misquotation, contrary to Robinson's assertion.
Appellee's Brief at 43. ARM asserted a similar basis. Cf. R. 1111-13 with R. 1117-20.
This alone establishes that the court's finding of bad faith was clearly erroneous.
CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, ARM and Solar respectfully request (1) an order reversing
the district court's (a) May 5, 2016 Ruling and Order on summary judgment, (b) October
24, 2016 Order and (c) March 14, 2017 Order and Final Judgment on attorney fees; and
16

Blum v. Dahl, 2012 UT App 198,112,283 P.3d 963, which Robinson cites, is no
different. In contrast to this case, the plaintiff in Blum "testified untruthfully" and
admitted to bringing the case, not to recover for the tort she alleged, "but in an effort to
end perceived harassment and discrimination." Id. 11 10, 13.
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(j

(2) an order that Robinson shall not receive any attorney fees in the trial court or on
appeal.
DATED THIS 27th day of November, 2017.
Durham Jones & Pinegar, P.C.

~

av1 .
Peter H. Donaldso
Lyndon R. Bradshaw
Attorneys for Appellants
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